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 Suppression of feared future episodes induces forgetting  
 Acute stress interferes with successful suppression 
 WM capacity moderates the effect of stress on suppression-induced forgetting of fears 

















Unwanted imaginations of future fears can, to some extent, be avoided. This is achieved by 
control mechanisms similar to those engaged to suppress and forget unwanted memories. Suppression-
induced forgetting relies on the executive control network, whose functioning is impaired after exposure 
to acute stress. This study investigates whether acute stress affects the ability to intentionally control 
future fears and, furthermore, whether individual differences in executive control predict a 
susceptibility to these effects. The study ran over two consecutive days. On day 1, the working memory 
capacity of one hundred participants was assessed. Thereafter, participants provided descriptions and 
details of fearful episodes that they imagined might happen in their future. On day 2, participants were 
exposed to either the stress or no-stress version of the Maastricht Acute Stress Test, after which 
participants performed the Imagine/No-Imagine task. Here, participants repeatedly imagined some 
future fears and suppressed imaginings of others. Results demonstrated that, in unstressed participants, 
suppression successfully induced forgetting of the episodes’ details compared to a baseline condition. 
However, anxiety toward these events did not differ. Acute stress was found to selectively impair 
suppression-induced forgetting and, further, this effect was moderated by working memory capacity. 
Specifically, lower working memory predicted a susceptibility to these detrimental effects. These 
findings provide novel insights into conditions under which our capacity to actively control future fears 
is reduced, which may have considerable implications for understanding stress-related 
psychopathologies and symptomatologies characterized by unwanted apprehensive thoughts. 
 
Key words: Suppression-induced forgetting, Episodic future thinking, Anxiety, Working memory, 
Acute stress, Maastricht Acute Stress Test (MAST)  
 
1. Introduction  
Imaginations of our future are based on thoughts of past events (Schacter et al., 2017). However, 
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we keep revisiting and which we forget (Benoit et al., 2016). These attempts of intentional control serve 
as an adaptive emotion regulation strategy, fostering the retrieval of positive experiences and inducing 
the forgetting of other experiences that pose a threat to our integrity and well-being (e.g., fear-related 
thoughts; Nørby; 2018). The inability to control fear-related memories plays a key role in the 
development and maintenance of stress-related psychopathology, observable as intrusive and worrying 
thoughts in anxiety and mood disorders (Hertel and Gerstle, 2003; Joormann et al., 2005; Mary et al., 
2020). Despite these far-reaching implications, the factors that influence our capacity to intentionally 
control our future fears are largely unknown.  
Intentional control of future thoughts or past memories comprises two distinct processes: 
intentional retrieval (positive control) and suppression (negative control), which subsequently leads to 
the enhancement or impairment of memory, respectively (Anderson and Green, 2001; for meta-
analyses, see Anderson and Huddleston, 2012; Stramaccia et al., 2019). Suppression can be achieved 
via inhibitory control, an executive control function that can be engaged to stop memory retrieval 
(Anderson and Huddleston, 2012). Individual differences in executive control, therefore, have been 
suggested to account for variation in the ability to suppress unwanted memories (Anderson and Green, 
2001; Levy and Anderson, 2008). Executive control is also a critical element of working memory, 
guiding attention to relevant and inhibiting irrelevant information (Kane et al., 2001; Marsh and Hicks, 
1998). Importantly, higher working memory capacity has been found to predict an increased ability to 
intentionally suppress thoughts (Brewin and Beaton, 2002).  
The ability to intentionally control future thoughts can be enabled through control mechanisms 
similar to those engaged when we recall our past memories (Benoit et al., 2016). Suppression of future 
fear imaginings relies on an executive control network, guided by the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC), which downregulates activity in the ventromedial PFC and hippocampus (Benoit et al., 2016). 
These regions support the retrieval of past episodes and the simulation of future events (Addis et al., 
2007; Benoit and Schacter, 2015; Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2017). Activity in the 
ventromedial PFC can be more strongly engaged when imaginations are situated in more familiar 
contexts (Benoit et al., 2014). Familiar contexts increase the vividness of our imaginations (Szpunar 
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downregulation of these regions has been linked to successful suppression and subsequent forgetting 
(Benoit and Anderson, 2012; Gagnepain et al., 2014).   
Acute stress alters, amongst others, functioning of frontal and temporal brain areas implicated 
in intentional control (Hermans et al., 2014). The dlPFC is a key neural substrate of the executive control 
network and activity in this region is found to reduce after acute stress exposure (McEwen and 
Morrison, 2013). In large-scale brain networks, the combined autonomic nervous system (ANS) and 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) acute stress response systems prompt the reallocation of 
resources to the salience network, promoting a hypervigilant state at the expense of the executive control 
network (Hermans et al., 2011, 2014). In addition, increased levels of cortisol can result in impairments 
of dlPFC associated higher cognitive functions such as working memory (Oei et al., 2006; Schoofs et 
al., 2009; for meta-analysis, see Shields et al., 2015). These impairing effects peak during a period in 
which both the rapidly acting ANS and slower HPA stress response systems are activated (Elzinga and 
Roelofs, 2005). Furthermore, increased activation of the sympathetic stress response has been related 
to lower baseline working memory (Hernaus et al., 2018). 
Based on these findings, the aim of the current study was two-fold. First, to investigate the 
influence of acute stress on the suppression of future fears. In the absence of acute stress, suppressing 
imaginings of future fears causes forgetting of details that are associated with the feared event and, 
further, attenuates anxiety toward that event (Benoit et al., 2016). In addition to replicating these 
original findings within the control (unstressed) condition, we hypothesized that acute stress would 
negatively affect the ability to suppress imaginations of future feared events, preventing suppression-
induced forgetting and attenuation of anxiety. Second, to explore whether individual differences in 
working memory capacity influence the efficacy of suppression after exposure to an acute stressor.  
Acute stress was elicited using the ‘Maastricht Acute Stress Test’ (MAST), a potent and reliable 
procedure to elicit subjective, autonomic and glucocorticoid stress responses (Quaedflieg et al., 2017; 
Smeets et al., 2012). To assess the intentional control of fear imaginings, the current study employed 
an adapted version of the ‘Imagine/No-Imagine’ task, tailored to the retrieval and suppression of future 
feared events (Benoit et al., 2016). Working memory capacity was assessed using the digit span task as 












2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Participants 
The a-priori power calculation with G* Power (α = 0.05, 1-β = 0.85; Faul et al., 2007), based 
on the suppression effect reported in Benoit et al. (2016), indicated a required sample of 90 participants. 
In total, one hundred healthy participants were recruited via university subject pools and online study 
advertisement. All participants were aged between 18-35 and were screened for the following inclusion 
criteria: BMI between 17.5-28; drink less than 10 alcoholic drinks per week; smoke less than 10 
cigarettes per week; no use of medication in the previous week; use drugs less than twice per month 
and have no history of mental illness within the past five years. All females were using hormonal 
contraception, to control for the known influence on the cortisol stress response (Kirschbaum et al., 
1999; Strahler et al., 2017). Eight participants were excluded from the analysis due to missing data as 
a result of measurement error. The final sample consisted of 92 participants (23 male). All participants 
provided written informed consent and were reimbursed with University credits or monetary 
compensation. The test protocols were approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Neuroscience, Maastricht University.  
 
2.2. Design  
Participants were randomly allocated into one of two conditions (stress: n=50; control: n=50). 
The study ran over two consecutive test days for a duration of approximately 1.5 and 2.5 hours, 
respectively. Day 1 testing ran between 08:30am-12:00pm. To avoid fluctuations in the circadian 
rhythm of cortisol, day 2 testing ran between 12:30-18:30pm. Prior to each session, participants were 
instructed to refrain from eating, smoking, strenuous exercise or drinking anything but non-sparkling 
water for 2 hours before testing.  
2.3. Imagine/No-Imagine paradigm 
Intentional control of future fears was assessed using an adapted version of the Imagine/No-
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Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). The original paradigm consists of three phases, designed to be 
completed over one session. The current study divided the three phases over two days (see Fig. 2). To 
account for the 24 hour delay between sessions, an additional ‘Reminder Task’ was added and is 
described in the procedure.  
Phase 1 
On day 1, participants generated descriptions of 18 future feared events. The descriptions 
generated were then summarised by participants, by a 15-word limit. Participants then generated 
corresponding reminder words, which act as a cue for the associated fear. Each fear had to fulfil six 
criteria: the event must be negative; imaginable through their own eyes; possibly occur within 
approximately the next two years; be a specific episode that occurs over a short time; and, importantly, 
it must be an event they tend to think about. Participants also provided subjective ratings for each fear 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely) based on: vividness; emotional intensity; anxiety; 
likelihood of occurrence; frequency of thought; and distance in the future. These subjective ratings were 
used to equally and randomly divide fear items into one of three stimuli categories: Imagine; No-
Imagine; or baseline.  
On day 2, after the reminder task, participants provided a typical detail for each of the 18 fears 
they had listed on day 1. These details were supposed to relate to a specific element envisioned in the 
participants’ imagination (see Fig. 1). It could not be a word from the description, nor could it be too 
similar to the reminder cue.  
Phase 2  
The Imagine/No-Imagine manipulation tasked participants to actively imagine some of their 
future fears and to suppress imaginations of others. During this phase, we presented all six reminder 
cues of the Imagine and of the No-Imagine items. Baseline items were not cued during this phase. Each 
reminder cue was repeatedly presented (12 times each) in a random order, with the restriction that no 
more than three reminder cues of the same condition (i.e., Imagine, No-Imagine) could be shown 
consecutively. During Imagine trials, participants were instructed to vividly imagine the associated fear. 
With each repetition of the same reminder cue, participants were instructed to build on what they had 
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block out all imagination of the event until the reminder cue disappeared from the screen and do so 
without using distraction tactics, such as replacing the imagination with an alternative thought. Further, 
they were instructed that if any thoughts about the event did enter their mind, they should actively push 
the event out of mind. Participants completed the task in silence and maintained their focus on the 
reminder cues. Each trial began with a centred fixation cross with a random duration of 2-2.5 seconds, 
followed by either an Imagine or No-Imagine cue (1.5 seconds), followed by a corresponding reminder 
cue (4 seconds; see Fig. 1). Imagine trials appeared in green text and No-Imagine trials appeared in red 
text. At the end of each trial, participants responded to the question: “How often did you imagine the 
future fear?” (1= never; 2 = sometimes; 3 = always).  
Prior to the main task, participants completed the practice phase, in which they were provided 
with the descriptions and reminder cues of 3 example fears to familiarise themselves with the 
Imagine/No-Imagine procedure. Two reminder cues were presented in the No-Imagine condition (in 
red font) and one reminder cue was presented in the Imagine condition (in green font).  
Phase 3 
The effects of the Imagine/No-Imagine manipulation were assessed in the cued recall phase. 
Here, participants recalled all typical details for each event of the Imagine, No-Imagine and baseline 
categories in response to their respective reminder cue (presented in black font). All 18 reminder cues 
were presented in a random order for 4 seconds each, during which participants had to recall the 
corresponding typical detail aloud. The experimenter recorded the percentage of correctly recalled 
typical details in the Imagine, No-Imagine and baseline categories. 
The effects of the manipulation on anxiety were assessed in the final task. Participants were 
presented with all 18 reminder cues in a random order for 1 minute each. During this time, participants 
vividly described the future feared event aloud. At the end of each trial, participants rated their current 











Figure 1. Outline of the three phases of the Imagine/No-Imagine paradigm with example fears. 
Phase 1: participants generated descriptions, reminder cues, typical details and subjective ratings of 
future feared events. Phase 2: in response to reminder cues, participants intentionally retrieved (Imagine 
items) or suppressed (No-Imagine items) imaginations of the associated fear. At the end of each trial, 
participants reported how often they had imagined the fear (1 = never; 2 = sometimes; 3 = always). 
Phase 3: cued recall and anxiety assessment. In response to reminder cues, participants recalled typical 
details for all Imagine, No-Imagine and baseline items. Hereafter, the reminder cues were presented 
once more and participants freely described the associated fear before providing a final anxiety rating 
with respect to that event. 
 
2.4. The Maastricht Acute Stress Test 
The Maastricht Acute Stress Test (MAST) was used to activate the human stress system (see 
Smeets et al., 2012). The MAST consists of a 5 minute instruction phase, followed by a 10 minute acute 
stress phase alternating between two trial types: exposure to ice-cold water (4°C) and challenging 
mental arithmetic, in which participants count backwards in increments of 17 as fast and as accurately 
as possible, starting at 2043. The experimenter only provided negative feedback, addressing mistakes 
and speed of the arithmetic. Participants were told that they would be videotaped throughout in order 
to later analyse their facial expressions during the task. Unbeknownst to participants, the video camera 
did not record any footage and the data were not used at any point. 
The no-stress control version aims to not elicit a stress response. Participants were required to 
immerse their hand in lukewarm water (between 35-37°C) and count continuously from 1-25 for mental 
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2.5. Physiological stress measures  
Systolic and diastolic blood pressure (SBP; DBP) were measured from the right arm at 6 time 
points during day 2 (tpre-stress, tstress, t+0, t+10, t+30, t+50). Blood pressure measurements were recorded using 
an Omron 705IT (HEM-759-E; Omron Healthcare Europe BV). 
Salivary cortisol samples were obtained at 4 time points (tpre-stress, t+10, t+30, t+50) via synthetic 
Salivettes (Sarstedt1, Etten- Leur, The Netherlands). Saliva samples were stored at -20°C after 
collection until cortisol concentrations were determined by a commercially available 
chemiluminescence immunoassay with high sensitivity (IBL International, Hamburg, Germany). The 
intra and interassay coefficients were below 9%.  
 
2.6. Subjective stress 
 Participants self-reported how stressful, how painful and how unpleasant they had perceived 
the MAST via three 100 mm Visual Analog Scales (VASs; anchors: 0 = not at all; 100 = extremely). 
Subjective stress was determined via the mean score of the three VASs for each participant. 
 Mood ratings were recorded pre and post stress induction through completion of the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS includes two 10-item mood 
scales relating to positive affect (PANAS-P) or negative affect (PANAS-N). Each item is rated on a 5-




Stress-induced changes in state anxiety were measured via the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI-S; Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI-S consists of 20 self-report items, with scores recorded 
on a 4-point Likert scale in response to how anxious the participant feels at the present moment (1 = 











Ashton et al. 
10 
 
2.8. Working memory 
The Digit Span Task from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (Wechsler, 1981) 
was used to assess working memory capacity. Participants were read aloud a sequence of digits and 
asked to repeat the digits back either in the same order (forward condition) or the reverse order 
(backward condition). After two sequences of the same digit span length were completed successfully, 
the participant would proceed to the next. Each sequence increased in increments of 1 digit. If two 
errors were made on one sequence, the task was stopped. Scores obtained from the backward condition 
(WMBackwards) were used as a measure of working memory capacity for later analysis. Performance on 
the backward condition has been found to correlate with activity in the right dlPFC, a key neural 
substrate of intentional memory control (Hoshi et al., 2000).  
 
2.9. Procedure 
On test day 1 (see Fig. 2), participants were first given information regarding the experiment 
and thereafter provided informed consent. Next, participants completed baseline questionnaires and 
subsequently performed the digit span task. For the remainder of test day 1, participants generated 18 
fear descriptions and corresponding reminder cues (I/NI, phase 1).  
On test day 2 (see Fig. 2), participants first completed the reminder task. During this task, all 
18 reminder cues that were created on day 1 were presented for up to 1.5 minutes. During that time, 
participants vividly described all imaginations of the fears aloud. After each trial, the corresponding 
fear description was presented for 10 seconds as feedback. Participants then completed the remainder 
of phase 1, generating typical details for each fear description. Following this, participants completed 
the practice phase of the I/NI task. Pre-stress measures of negative affect, state anxiety, blood pressure 
and saliva were then recorded (tpre-stress). This was immediately followed by exposure to either the stress 
or no-stress version of the MAST. Blood pressure was measured once during the task (tstress) and 
immediately after (t+0). Following this, participants completed subjective stress, negative affect and 
state anxiety questionnaires. Ten minutes after completion of the MAST, blood pressure and the second 
saliva sample were taken (t+10). Participants then continued to the first block of the Imagine/No-Imagine 
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then participants proceeded to block two under the same instructions. EEG data were recorded of each 
participant during phase 2. However, these results are not reported in this paper. After completion, the 
final blood pressure and saliva samples were measured (t+50). This was followed by a cued-recall task 
to test memories for the typical details and a subsequent free simulation task designed to provide a final 





Figure 2. Overview of the study procedure. Approximate timings (T) are denoted in minutes. 
 
2.10. Behavioural & Statistical Analysis 
For the Imagine/No-Imagine paradigm, intrusions were determined based on the subjective 
ratings recorded during No-Imagine trials in phase 2. Responses of 2 or 3 were classified as intrusions 
(following Levy and Anderson, 2012; Benoit et al., 2015), indicating that the participant had been 
unsuccessful in fully suppressing the imaginations of the associated future fear.  
In line with previous studies (Hellerstedt et al., 2016; Kuhl et al. 2007), we calculated a subject-
specific measure of forgetting relative to baseline memory performance. The suppression-induced 
forgetting (SIF) index was calculated by subtracting the recall of No-Imagine items from Baseline items 
and then dividing by Baseline items ((Baseline – No-Imagine) / Baseline). Higher positive index scores 
indicate increased forgetting. This index calculation was also applied to intentional retrieval, in order 
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Analyses of anxiety changes following the Imagine/No-Imagine manipulation were based on, 
the final ratings (phase 3). Single value index scores were calculated for suppressed and retrieved items, 
respectively (suppression: ((Baseline anxiety – No-Imagine anxiety) / Baseline anxiety); retrieval: 
((Baseline anxiety – Imagine anxiety) / Baseline anxiety)). We then multiplied these measures by -1 to 
render positive instead of negative values, thus higher positive index scores indicate increased anxiety.  
Statistical analysis were performed using SPSS Statistics for Windows, version 25 (SPSS Inc., 
Chicago, Ill., USA). All data were checked for normality using Q-Q plots and Shapiro-Wilk tests. A 
log-transformation was performed to account for skewed cortisol data, the values of which were used 
in subsequent analyses. Eight participants were identified as outliers due to recall and anxiety index 
scores of more than 2.5 SDs below the mean. These participants were excluded from further analyses. 
Therefore, the final sample size was 84 (stress: n=43 (10 male); control: n=41 (11 male)).  
Independent t-tests, one-sample t-tests and repeated measures ANOVA’s were performed. In 
cases of violated normality or sphericity, adjusted Welch’s F ratios and Greenhouse-Geisser corrected 
values are reported, respectively. Two-tailed p-values are reported for interaction analyses for the stress 
manipulation and the moderation analysis of working memory. One-tailed p-values are reported for 
planned directed comparisons for the stress and Imagine/No-Imagine manipulations. ANOVA results 
are supplemented with Partial Eta Squared values (ηp2) as a measure of effect size (ηp2 of 0.01 indicate 
small effects, ηp2 of 0.06 medium effects, and ηp2 of 0.14 large effects; Fritz et al., 2012). Results from 
t-tests are supplemented with Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size, calculated by the mean difference 
score as the numerator and the average standard deviation of both groups as the denominator (Cohen’s 
d of 0.20 indicate small effects, 0.50 medium effects and 0.80 large effects; Cohen, 1988).  
 
3. Results  
3.1. Successful acute stress induction via the MAST  
3.1.1. Physiological stress responses  
Significant increases in blood pressure and cortisol confirmed the success of the acute stress 
induction. One participant had missing data for blood pressure. To assess the difference in 
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measures ANOVA was performed on blood pressure recordings (SBP and DBP) with Time (6 levels: 
tpre-stress, tstress, t+0, t+10, t+30, t+50) as the within-subjects (WS) factor and Condition (2 levels: stress vs. 
control) as the between-subject (BS) factor. Results revealed that systolic and diastolic blood pressure 
were elevated in response to the stress-version of the MAST, but not in response to the control 
manipulation (Time*Condition; SBP: F(3.49, 282.82)=34.00, p<.001, ηp2 = 0.30; DBP: F(2.57, 207.95)= 43.13, 
p<.001, ηp2= 0.35; see Fig. 3). Follow-up tests demonstrated that, prior to the MAST, the conditions did 
not differ significantly in blood pressure (both p’s >.16). Commencing the MAST, the conditions 
differed significantly at tstress (SBP: t(81)= -6.16, p<.001, d= 1.36; DBP: t(81)= -7.03, p<.001, d=1.56), t+0 
(SBP: t(81)= -6.15, p<.001, d=1.36; DBP: t(81)= -6.82, p<.001, d=1.50) and t+10 (SBP: t(81)= -2.28, p=.013, 
d=0.39; DBP: t(82)= -3.28, p=.001, d=0.23) and t+30 (SBP: t(81)= -1.90, p=.031, d=0.42). No significant 
differences were observed at t+30 for DBP and t+50 for both SBP and DBP (all p’s>.09).  
To assess the effects of the MAST on the neuroendocrine response, we performed a repeated-
measures ANOVA on cortisol concentrations at different time points (WS; Time, 4 levels: tpre-stress, t+10, 
t+30, t+50) for each condition (BS; 2 levels: stress vs. control). The analysis revealed elevated 
concentrations in stressed participants compared to controls (Time*Condition: F(2.18, 178.36)=14.78, 
p<.001, ηp2=0.15; see Fig. 3). Follow-up tests identified differences between groups at tpre-stress (t(82)= -
2.67, p=.005, d=0.58), t+10 (t(82)= -7.68, p<.001, d=1.68), t+30 (t(82)= -6.93, p<.001, d=1.52) and t+50 (t(82)= 
-3.74, p<.001, d=0.82). Pairwise comparisons with the Holm-Bonferroni correction (Holm, 1979) were 
performed to assess the change in cortisol levels between the time-points within each condition. In 
stressed participants, cortisol levels increased significantly between tpre-stress and t+10 (p=.003) and 
subsequently decreased between t+10 and t+30, and between t+30 and t+50 (both p’s=.003). Contrastingly, 
in unstressed participants, cortisol levels decreased significantly between tpre-stress and t+10 (p=.003). 


































Figure 3. Physiological and neuroendocrine stress response. Systolic and diastolic blood pressure 
(SBP; DBP; Panel A) and untransformed salivary cortisol concentrations (Panel B) in response to the 
MAST and throughout the Imagine/No-Imagine (I/NI) task. Significant differences between groups are 
indicated (** p<.001; * p<.05). Graphs display means and errors bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.  
 
3.1.2. Subjective stress responses  
Participants in the stress condition reported higher subjective stress compared to controls. The 
independent samples t-test revealed that participants in the stress condition experienced the 
experimental manipulation as significantly more stressful than participants in the control condition 
(VAS: t(82)= -22.27, p<.001, d=4.90; see table 1). Furthermore, negative affect and state anxiety 
increased significantly in stressed participants compared to unstressed participants (PANAS-N; 
Time*Condition: F(1,82)= 45.41, p<.001, ηp2=0.36; STAI-S: Time*Condition: F(1,82)= 92.03, p<.001, 
ηp2=0.53). Follow up tests revealed no significant difference between the conditions at the pre-stress 
measure (both p’s>.19) and a significant difference at the post-stress measure (PANAS-N: t(82)= -7.19, 












3.2. Acute stress impairs suppression-induced forgetting of future fear details  
In order to investigate whether acute stress influenced the success of suppression during No-
Imagine trials, the total amount of intrusions reported by stressed and unstressed participants were 
compared using an independent samples t-test. Due to measurement error, one participant had missing 
data and was excluded from this part of the analysis only. Stressed participants reported a significantly 
greater amount of intrusions compared to unstressed participants (t(81)=-2.63, p=.005, d=0.58; see Fig. 
4A), demonstrating that acute stress impaired the ability to suppress imaginations of future fear details. 
The effect of acute stress on suppression-induced forgetting was assessed using an independent 
samples t-test with Condition (2 levels: stress vs. control) as the between subjects variable. Acute stress 
impaired the ability to forget, as reflected by a lower SIF index in stressed participants compared to 
unstressed participants (t(82)= 2.22, p=.015, d=0.49; see Fig. 4B and Table 1)1. Follow up tests were 
performed using one sample t-tests for each condition. The SIF index of stressed participants was not 
significantly different from zero (t(40)=-1.43, p=.081, d=0.21), indicating an impairment in suppression-
induced forgetting. In contrast, SIF for unstressed participants was significant (t(40)=1.81, p=.039, 
d=0.28). We thus replicated the original finding by Benoit et al. (2016) that suppression of future fear 
details leads to subsequent forgetting.  
For anxiety toward suppressed future fear details, an independent samples t-test was performed 
with condition (2 levels: stress vs. control) on the suppression index. Although numerically higher 
indices were observed in stressed participants, indicating increased anxiety, this did not differ 
significantly from unstressed participants (t(82)=0.72, p=.24, d=0.16 ; see Fig. 4C). Unlike Benoit et al. 
(2016), we did not find evidence for attenuated anxiety (t(40)=0.11, p=.46, d=0.01).  
                                                 
1To investigate whether acute stress had influenced recall in general, and therefore excluding items that were cued 
in the Imagine/No-Imagine manipulation (phase 2), we performed an exploratory independent samples t-test on 
the recall scores for baseline items between stressed and unstressed participants. No significant group difference 













Figure 4. Suppression Indices: Total number of intrusions (Panel A), suppression-induced forgetting 
index (Panel B) and index for anxiety of suppressed items (Panel C) for each condition. Positive SIF 
index values indicate increased forgetting and positive anxiety index values indicate increased anxiety. 
Significant differences between groups are indicated (* p<.05). Split violin plots display the distribution 
of the data, group means (indicated by the black bar) and individual data points.  
 
3.3. Acute stress does not influence the intentional retrieval of future fear details  
The effect of acute stress on intentional retrieval of future fear details was assessed using an 
independent samples t-test with Condition (2 levels: stress vs. control) as the between-subjects variable 
(see Fig. 5A). The retrieval index was not found to differ between stressed and unstressed participants 
(t(82)= 1.18, p=.12, d=0.26; see Fig. 5A), suggesting that acute stress did not influence the intentional 
retrieval of fear details. Within the control condition, one-sample t-tests showed that the retrieval index 
did not differ significantly from zero (t(40)=1.41, p=.084, d=0.22), consistent with Benoit et al. (2016).  
For anxiety toward retrieved fears, an independent samples t-test was performed with condition 
(2 levels: stress vs. control) and the retrieval index. No significant difference was observed between 
conditions (t(82)= 0.52, p=.30, d=0.11; see Fig. 5B), suggesting that acute stress did not influence anxiety 
toward imagined future fear details. Within the control condition, one sample t-tests showed that the 
retrieval index differed significantly from zero (t(40)=2.83, p=.004, d=0.44), suggesting that retrieval of 



























Figure 5. Retrieval Indices: Intentional retrieval index (Panel A) and index for anxiety of retrieved 
items (Panel B) for each condition. Positive SIF index values indicate increased forgetting and positive 
anxiety index values indicate increased anxiety. Split violin plots display the distribution of the data, 
group means (indicated by the black bar) and individual data points. 
 
Table 1 
Means (± SE) of subjective stress, negative affect and state anxiety scores before and after the MAST, 
recalled fear details and anxiety ratings for each stimulus type in the stress and control conditions.  
 
 Subjective stress 
 VAS PANAS-N STAI-S 
  Pre Post Pre Post 
Stress 71.68 (2.61) 7.21 (0.42)  10.02 (0.61)  37.60 (1.46) 49.74 (1.54) 
Control  6.07 (1.26) 6.73 (0.33) 5.49 (0.16) 36.07 (1.39) 31.56 (1.00) 
 Fear detail recall (%) 
 Imagine No-Imagine Baseline 
Stress 63.47 (3.89) 67.05 (3.11) 66.28 (3.35) 
Control 63.81 (3.68) 62.19 (3.64) 71.54 (2.92) 
 Anxiety ratings 
 Imagine No-Imagine Baseline 
Stress 3.54 (0.10) 3.42 (0.11) 3.38 (0.11) 
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3.5. Moderation of the effect of acute stress on suppression-induced forgetting by working 
memory capacity 
To investigate the moderating effect of working memory on the stress-induced impairment in 
suppression induced forgetting, a multiple regression analysis using the PROCESS tool for SPSS 
(Model 1 with 1000 bootstrapping) was performed with scores from the backward condition 
(WMBackwards) of the digit span task as a moderator.  
The overall model including condition was significant (WMBackwards: F(3,80)=4.68, p=.005, 
R²=0.15). In support of our prior t-test result, condition significantly predicted differences in 
suppression-induced forgetting (b=-1.29, t(80)=-3.36, p=.001, CI [-2.05, -0.53]). Furthermore, a 
significant interaction between condition and working memory was observed (b=0.21, t(80)=2.92, 
p=.005, CI [0.07, 0.35], see Fig. 6). To explore this effect, further simple slope analyses on the 
conditional effects of condition were tested at two levels of working memory: low (-1SD = 4.04) and 
high (+1SD = 6.49). A lower working memory capacity significantly contributed to the effect of acute 
stress on suppression-induced forgetting (WMBackwards(low): b=-0.45, t(80)= -3.68, p<.001, CI [-0.69, -
0.21]). A higher working memory capacity did not contribute significantly (p=.63). This indicates that 
suppression-induced forgetting of lower capacity individuals was influenced by acute stress; in contrast, 
this effect was absent in higher capacity individuals.   
The overall model using the retrieval index did not prove significant (p=.67); therefore, there 
was no evidence that working memory capacity moderated effects of the intentional retrieval of fear 
details. Further, working memory was not found to moderate anxiety toward suppressed or retrieved 







Figure 6. Moderation by working memory: A model for the effect of acute stress on suppression-
induced forgetting, as moderated by working memory. The β coefficient for the significant interaction 
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4. Discussion  
The current study investigated the effects of acute stress on the intentional control of future 
fears. Further, we examined whether individual differences in executive control would moderate these 
effects. The effect of acute stress and its moderation by working memory capacity was selective for the 
suppression of future fears, as opposed to retrieval.  
Due to the known impairing effects of stress on executive control, we predicted that exposure 
to an acute stressor would impair the suppression of future fear details. This should thus hinder 
suppression-induced forgetting. Interestingly, acute stress significantly increased the number of 
intrusions reported by participants during attempted suppression. Consequently, stressed participants 
demonstrated a significantly lower SIF index compared to unstressed participants, corroborating the 
recent findings that stress impairs suppression-induced forgetting of unwanted memories (C.W.E.M. 
Quaedflieg, T.R. Schneider, J. Daume, A.K. Engel and L. Schwabe, unpublished observations). We did 
not find evidence that stress influenced anxiety toward suppressed fears. Previous research has found 
that, in the absence of noradrenergic activation, (genomic) glucocorticoid actions interfere with 
inhibitory processing (Shields et al., 2015). This concurs with present findings, supporting the notion 
that inhibitory control is critical for suppressing unwanted thoughts or memories (Benoit et al., 2016; 
Levy and Anderson, 2008). Furthermore, the fact that our data showed an effect that was specific to 
No-Imagine items speaks against the view that our findings represent another example for the well-
known stress-induced retrieval changes (de Quervain et al., 2000; Gagnon and Wagner, 2016). If acute 
stress had merely affected retrieval per se, one would have expected that memory for baseline and 
Imagine fear details would also have been affected. This was, however, not the case.  
The dlPFC facilitates successful suppression-induced forgetting of future fears by 
downregulating activity in the vmPFC and hippocampus (Benoit et al, 2016). On the one hand, forebrain 
circuits are involved in regulating the HPA axis response and stress integrative functions (Ulrich-Lai 
and Herman, 2009). On the other hand, non-genomic glucocorticoids switch the network balance in the 
brain, reducing activity in the executive network, including the dlPFC (Hermans et al., 2011, 2014; Qin 
et al., 2009). Moreover, individual differences in cortisol levels during stress recovery have been found 








Ashton et al. 
20 
 
down-regulation of the dlPFC may thus prevent the top-down inhibitory control signal to these regions 
(McEwen et al., 2016).  
Results further revealed that individuals with lower working memory capacity were more 
susceptible to the negative effects of acute stress on suppression-induced forgetting. In contrast, 
individuals with higher working memory were unaffected and their ability to forget did not differ from 
their counterparts in the control condition. This emphasizes the critical role executive control serves for 
suppressing imaginations of future fears under acute stress. Levy and Anderson (2008) suggested that 
individual differences in executive control are able to predict the success of intentional memory control. 
They further suggest that, as such, factors that influence the ability to engage efficient executive control 
should therefore also affect the latter. When observing intentional memory control effects in the absence 
of further manipulation, baseline working memory capacity has not been found to predict the outcome 
of suppression-induced forgetting (Waldhauser et al., 2011). However, when the demand of working 
memory is manipulated to a high load during memory control, suppression-induced forgetting has been 
found to decrease (Noreen and de Fockert, 2017). Furthermore, individuals with low working memory 
capacity have been found to be more susceptible to the detrimental effects of stress on other forms of 
higher cognitive functioning, such as goal-directed behaviour (Otto et al., 2013; Quaedflieg et al., 
2019). Combined, these past and current findings suggest that a reduced working memory capacity 
negatively affects suppression-induced forgetting and, furthermore, creates a vulnerability to the 
detrimental effects of stress.  
The physiological and subjective data provide evidence that the MAST successfully induced 
acute stress. In line with previous studies (e.g. Quaedflieg et al., 2017; Smeets et al., 2012), participants 
in the stress condition showed an increase in subjective stress, systolic and diastolic blood pressure and 
cortisol concentrations when compared to control. Expanding on findings from previous studies, 
participants in the stress condition reported increased state anxiety following the MAST. It has 
previously been shown that individuals with higher trait anxiety are less able to reduce feelings of 
anxiety toward future fears via suppression (Benoit et al., 2016). As such, an increase in state anxiety 
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It should be noted that the sample consisted of predominately female participants (n=73), all of 
which were using hormonal contraception. Hormonal alterations throughout the menstrual cycle have 
been related to the variability in cortisol responses after acute stress in women (Kudielka et al., 2009). 
The use of hormonal contraceptives has also been found to alter the learning and memory of emotional 
content under response to stress (Nielsen et al., 2014). As such, these findings may not generalize to 
naturally cycling women. It is also important to note that, unexpectedly, stressed participants 
demonstrated increased cortisol concentrations at baseline compared to unstressed participants. 
Although, relative to the baseline measure, stressed participants demonstrated an increase in cortisol 
after the MAST, whereas unstressed participants demonstrated a decrease. Participants were randomly 
allocated to each group and other factors that could account for variation in cortisol were controlled for 
(such as time of testing, age, weight, alcohol and drug intake; see Strahler et al., 2017). As such, we 
cannot offer conclusive reasoning to explain the initial difference at baseline. As a speculative 
explanation: it could be that the researchers’ approach toward participants differed unintentionally 
during interactions prior to the MAST, if they were aware that they would imminently have to induce 
acute stress. Future research may preclude this possibility by adopting a double-blind design in which 
an independent researcher performs the MAST across both conditions.  
Accumulating evidence points to the fascinating possibility that we can, to some degree, 
intentionally control our fears and thoughts by actively retrieving and imagining some experiences 
while suppressing others. The current study expands on previous findings by showing how suppression 
of fear imaginings can be deficient under acute stress and that this is moderated by individual 
differences in executive control. Specifically, a lower working memory capacity seems to predict a 
susceptibility to the detrimental effects of acute stress. Working memory can, to some extent, be 
improved. Working memory training has shown promising results, reducing symptomatology of 
anxiety and depression in vulnerable individuals (Beloe and Derakshan, 2019; Sari et al., 2016). 
However, it has been argued that, despite the benefits of working memory training, these learned skills 
do not transfer to other tasks (Gathercole et al., 2019). It would be of interest for future research to 
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In the presence of stress-related psychopathology, it has been shown that the efficacy in 
suppressing unwanted memories is reduced (Hertel and Gerstle, 2003; Joorman et al., 2005; Mary et 
al., 2020; Nørby, 2018). Moreover, meta-analytical evidence indicates, more generally, that individuals 
with problems in controlling intrusive thoughts are deficient in suppressing memories (Stramaccia et 
al., 2019). Here, we demonstrate that exposure to acute stress negatively affects suppression by 
increasing intrusions and impairing the ability to forget. Furthermore, individual differences in working 
memory moderate this effect. The current findings serve as an insightful step toward understanding the 
causes of failure in the intentional control of future fear imaginings.  
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